City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Publications and Research

Kingsborough Community College

2015

Buddhist Meditation and the Possibility of Free Will
Rick Repetti
CUNY Kingsborough Community College

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/kb_pubs/119
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

Science, Religion & Culture

Research Article

Buddhist Meditation and the Possibility of Free Will
Rick Repetti
Department of History, Philosophy & Political Science, Kingsborough Community College, 2001 Oriental Blvd., D-223, Brooklyn, NY 11235, 718-368-5226, USA.

Abstract | I argue that an analysis of Buddhist meditation theory and practice may be used to ground
a model of the possibility of free agency that stands up against four powerful arguments for free will
skepticism in contemporary analytic philosophy: Peter van Inwagen’s consequence argument, which
asserts that if choices are lawfully necessary consequences of prior events, then they are unfree; Derk
Pereboom’s two arguments for hard incompatibilism: the manipulation argument, which asserts that
manipulated choices are unfree, determinism is functionally equivalent to manipulation, and thus
determined choices are unfree; and the randomness argument, which asserts that we cannot claim authorship over random neural events; and Galen Strawson’s impossibility argument, which asserts that
choices are always conditioned by mental states, so unconditioned free will is impossible. Although
Buddhism sees the entire process that begins with beliefs and desires and culminates in actions as
an ultimately impersonal, agentless process, Buddhism is nonetheless capable of formulating the
diametrical opposite of Strawson’s impossibilism and Pereboom’s hard incompatibilism, what I call
possibilism or soft compatibilism, the view that free choices and actions can emerge from conditioned
or unconditioned mental states, independently of whether the world is deterministic. This is not to
suggest that Buddhism contains or endorses a theory of free will, but that Buddhism may formulate
such a theory.
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P

owerful arguments against the possibility of free
will have become dominant in contemporary
Western analytic philosophy. Buddhism has resources that may be deployed to formulate a position that
may stand up against four of the most powerful arguments for free will skepticism. I support this claim
in two stages. First, I address the four major arguments for free will skepticism, after outlining necessary terminology and positions shaping the debate. I
argue that one such argument may subsume the others, but I address them all because the subsumption
claim may be disputed, the others argue for the same
conclusion, and each might survive if the subsuming
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argument fails. Second, I show how Buddhist ideas
support a critique of those arguments. Although not
entirely linear, the explication is arranged for progressively complex comprehension. Also, I focus more on
these four specific Western arguments than I focus
on specific Buddhist analogues because I intend to
show Western philosophers that ‘Buddhism’—more
realistically, a variety of forms of Buddhism—has the
resources for rebutting those arguments.
Comparing specific Western philosophers with ‘Buddhism’ nonetheless appears asymmetrical, but where
appropriate I identify primary and/or secondary Bud-
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for incompatibilism, hard determinists add the premise that determinism is true (at the non-quantum level, based on the bulk of non-quantum-level science),
and conclude there is no autonomy. Libertarians are
autonomists who, conversely, add the premise that
we possess autonomy (for various reasons, e.g., expeThe Free Will Terrain
rience, phenomenology, and its necessity for morals
and other basic features of our humanistic self-conI present a fairly comprehensive introduction to the
ception), concluding that determinism must be false,
terminology, concepts, arguments, and issues at stake
at least of some central feature(s) of human agency,
in the free will debate, but I can only say so much here.
even if true of everything else.
dhist sources for more specific examination. The Buddhism-based account of free will formulated below is
endorsed by some Buddhist philosophers and disputed by others. (Repetti (2016) contains a comprehensive collection of such positions.)

For a greater introduction to the big picture regarding free
will, see Balaguer (2014), Caruso (2013), and Abelson
(2013). I prefer the term autonomy to free will. Autonomists
believe we sometimes exhibit a type of autonomy sufficient
for appropriately holding us morally responsible for

our actions; autonomy skeptics deny autonomism. Determinists think every event is the lawfully necessary
consequence of previous events; indeterminists reject
determinism. Compatibilists think autonomy is compatible with determinism. Compatibilist determinists
are soft determinists. Incompatibilists think autonomy is
incompatible with determinism (which excludes alternatives they consider necessary for autonomy). Incompatibilist autonomists are libertarians; incompatibilist
determinists are hard determinists. Hard indeterminists
think autonomy is incompatible with indeterminism;
soft indeterminists think autonomy is compatible with
indeterminism. Hard incompatibilists consider both
determinism and indeterminism incompatible with
autonomy. Impossibilists think autonomy is impossible
independently of whether determinism is true, because
every choice is conditioned by the mental state occurrent at the moment of choice. Illusionists are autonomy
skeptics who think our experiential grounds for belief
in autonomy are infected by subpersonal processes subject to illusion. Possibilists consider autonomy
possible regardless of what mental state one is in; soft
compatibilists think autonomy is compatible with determinism and indeterminism. Autonomy skeptics, pessimists, or non-autonomists include impossibilists, hard
determinists, hard indeterminists, hard incompatibilists, and illusionists; autonomy gnostics, optimists, or
autonomists include possibilists, soft determinists, soft
indeterminists (libertarians), and soft compatibilists.

Another powerful skeptical argument against autonomy is Pereboom’s manipulation or four-case argument
(Pereboom 2001). This argument sets forth a first case
of manipulation in which it is allegedly clear that
an agent who is secretly neurally manipulated is not
morally responsible, and then proceeds through three
other cases, the last of which involves only the claim
that the world is deterministic but involves no manipulation at all, but alleges that the agent is also not
morally responsible, and challenges the compatibilist
to identify a morally relevant distinction between any
features of any two adjacent cases, claiming it is impossible to do so. Pereboom advocates hard incompatibilism, which adds to the manipulation argument
the hard indeterminist’s randomness argument that if
indeterminism is true, choices are random and not
truly “up to” them, so autonomy is also incompatible
with indeterminism.

Perhaps the most powerful autonomy-skeptical argument is Strawson’s impossibility argument (Strawson
1986, 2016). He argues that autonomy is impossible—
independently of considerations about whether determinism is true—because every choice is conditioned
by whatever mental state we are in at and/or just prior
to the moment of choice, something Buddhism would
generally accept, but, Strawson adds, we cannot be
completely and ultimately responsible for the mental
state we happen to be in at any given moment, and so
no choice is totally free or unconditioned. Since we
cannot create ourselves ex nihilo, we can never be in
a mental state that was not conditioned by previous
One of the most powerful, seminal incompatibilist ar- mental states, back to our earliest mental state(s). But
guments, first proposed by Ginet, is van Inwagen’s con- if we can never be in an unconditioned mental state,
sequence argument, which asserts that if determinism is we can never be ultimately responsible for any mental
true, agents can never do other than what they are state we are in, nor for any choice we make that is
determined to do, and thus cannot be free (Ginet 1966; conditioned by that mental state. Thus, autonomy in
van Inwagen 1975). Although van Inwagen argues only the moral-responsibility-entailing sense is impossible.
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Compatibilism-Relevant Ideas
Let us begin with a discussion of some ideas in Buddhism that will be relevant to the issue of autonomy
and its compatibility with determinism, indeterminism, and the conditioning of mental states. I argue
that meditation and related volition-regulating disciplines that lead Buddhists toward liberation increase
autonomy-related abilities in the soft compatibilist
sense, and that an analysis of these abilities provides
the basis for a Buddhist counter to these skeptical arguments. The Buddhist meditative path is designed
to eliminate what Buddhist theory sees as the illusory belief in an ontologically substantive ego/self,
and with it the unregulated expression of ego-volitional preferences seen as fueling the illusory sense
of ego/self. However, the unregulated expression of
ego-based volitions is, from a Western perspective,
thought to be partly constitutive of autonomy. Western thought prizes the autonomy-related ability to act
on one’s desires and preferences, do as one pleases,
and make choices that are up to one whenever alternatives pull one in different directions. Thus, whereas
Buddhism generally eschews the idea of catering to
ego-volitional preferences, Western philosophy has
struggled to square these autonomy-related abilities
with determinism (in earlier times, to square them
with God’s foreknowledge, and more recently with
indeterminism). The closest to this that Buddhism
has struggled to explain is the problem of how volitional (karmic) formations can accrue to, or how reincarnation is possible for, individuals that are thought
to lack substantive selves.
Historically, Buddhism has not been concerned with
how individuals may be properly held morally responsible, for a number of inter-related reasons. First, because—though individual actors are considered causally (karmically) responsible, and though karma has
positive/negative connotations consistent with a kind
of consequentialism in which suffering should be reduced and happiness promoted—karmic consequences are not seen as retributive, but purely causal (Goodman 2009). Second, because blame of self/others are
sometimes treated differently. In the Bodhicāryāvatāra,
Śāntideva advises us to see others’ actions as ultimately impersonally caused (like bile production), but to
view our own actions as subject to self-regulation for
soteriological purposes (Shantideva and Padmakara
2009, 6:22-32), which self-regulative efforts avowed
Buddhists accept as ethically binding them, particuMay 2015 | Volume 2 | Issue 2 | Page 83
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larly in later (Mahāyāna) Buddhism, to cultivate the
pāramitās, six ethical character perfections (generosity,
moral disposition, perseverance, energy, meditative attainment, and wisdom), as well as the brahmavihāras,
the four divine abodes (loving-kindness, compassion,
sympathetic joy, and equanimity). This framework
does not fit neatly into Western metaethical categories, but focuses on perfecting ethical cultivation
within the soteriological framework of the Buddhist
path (Garfield 2015). Third, because Buddhist philosophy restricts warrants for philosophical inquiry
to what is soteriologically instrumental, and the issue
of blame and its problematic relationship with impersonal causal processes is not considered warranted (Gowans 2016). Fourth, because Buddhism sees
agency as ultimately impersonal and its illusion as the
cause of suffering, and is thus more concerned with
eliminating ego-volitional agency in favor of selfless/
altruistic volition than with defending it.
Likely due to its recent encounters with Western philosophy and science, however, scholars of Buddhism
have recently tried to articulate what Buddhism can
say about the problem of autonomy (Adam 2010; Coseru 2016; Davis 2016; Federman 2010, 2016; Friquegnon 2016; Garfield 2014; Gier and Kjellberg 2004;
Gómez 1975; Goodman 2009, 2016; Griffiths 1982;
Harvey 2007, 2016; Hyland 2014; Meyers 2010, 2016;
Rāhula 1974; Repetti 2016; Siderits 1987, 2008; Story 1976; Tuske 2013; Wallace 2011). And as Western
philosophers of mind have come to see the nature of
mind, agency, and action in increasingly impersonal
terms, they have turned an eye toward Buddhism to
mine its rich history of philosophical articulation of
these ideas (Blackmore 2014; Davis and Thompson
2015; Flanagan 2011; Strawson 1986, 2016; Thompson 2015). Toward this end, I defend the idea that
Buddhist thought can ground a moral-responsibility-entailing autonomy against all four major skeptical arguments, but let us first sketch the autonomist
possibilism that represents the target of these skeptical
arguments.
Classical compatibilists, like Hume, argued that autonomy is compatible with determinism because it is
not the fact that our actions are caused that matters
here, but how they are caused. Classical compatibilists
offer divergent accounts of how our actions are supposed to be appropriately caused, but typically these
accounts are articulated in negative terms—involving
the absence of freedom-undermining conditions. For

example, if not coerced, constrained, compulsive, the
result of brainwashing, torture, or manipulation, all
freedom-undermining conditions, then that they are
caused need not undermine the claim that they may
be sufficiently free in the moral-responsibility-entailing sense. Neo-compatibilists attempt more explicitly
naturalistic, sophisticated, positive accounts of such
matters, focusing generally on whether or not the
agent exhibits the appropriate sort of proximal control over her action-producing processes; for example,
what matters for these accounts is whether or not
they are voluntary, reason-responsive, in accord with
preferences or values, the result of deliberation, and so
forth. Some neo-compatibilist accounts combine the
absence of negative conditions with the presence of
positive conditions.
Though much in Buddhism and in thinking about autonomy exceeds it, I focus on what fits within a naturalistic framework, to occupy the more parsimonious
position. Central Buddhist ideas posing an immediate
problem for the notion of autonomy are: impermanence, mereological reductionism or eliminativism (the
partial or complete denial of partite wholes), dependent origination, and insubstantiality or emptiness. Each
of these ideas implies anātman (non-self ), denial of
the (non-Buddhist Indian) ātman (the unchanging,
immaterial self/soul). Impermanence characterizes
all conditioned phenomena (Dhammapada 277-279):
nothing in form (spatiotemporal) lasts unchanged
more than an instant. Thus, if there is any candidate
for a self-like element, it is at best a momentary flash
in a temporally-contiguous psychophysical series of
shifting impersonal elements.
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whole relations, including Nagasena and Milinda.

According to the doctrine of dependent origination
(pratītya samutpāda), which resembles determinism,
because all conditioned phenomena originate in dependence on other conditioned phenomena, no conditioned phenomenon exists autonomously. The Buddha stated, “When that is present, this comes to be;
on the arising of that, this arises. When that is absent,
this does not come to be; on the cessation of that, this
ceases.” (Majjhima Nikāya 1.262 ff.; Saṃyutta Nikāya
2.28) An organism, say, cannot exist independently of
extra-organismic, eco-system-dependent conditions.
Since no conditioned phenomena exist independently,
all conditioned phenomena and beings are metaphysically insubstantial or empty, lacking any independent
ontological/existential essence, status, or intrinsic nature. Western philosophers might interpret this as a
Buddhist claim to the effect that there are no natural kinds, the self included. Natural kinds are sets or
types of things that putatively have mind-independent features in common, such as chemical elements,
as opposed to sets or types of things that only have
mind-dependent characteristics in common, such as
the characteristic of being called by a certain nickname or of tasting lemonade. The self lacks substantive reality on all these grounds.
Further, the Buddha rejected the idea that any of the
(mereological) ‘aggregates’ that compose us (body,
volition, cognition, feeling, etc.) constitute a self, because if such an aggregate did, it could will itself—
without mediation—into a non-afflicted state, but no
part of us can (Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta; Adam 2010).
Just as Western philosophers have objected that the
Cartesian mind—being immaterial—cannot interact
with any physical brain/body, exposing the incoherence of the notion of immaterial mind, Buddhist philosophers, principal among them Nāgārjuna, objected
that the unchanging nonphysical ātman would be incapable of doing anything (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā;
Federman 2010). These arguments are mutually confirming: whatever might constitute self cannot be
causally inert, therefore cannot exist independently,
and thus must be dependently originated, momentary,
partite, and empty, and vice versa.

A whole is at best just a way of designating a configuration of parts, but does not exist independently of
the parts, nor is it identical to them (for they are many
and it is one): it is merely a conceptual imputation; see
Milindapañha, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, and Siderits
(2003). Thus, the ‘self ’ is just a convenient designation for the psychophysical series. Some Buddhists
are reductionists, others eliminativists, but all reject
the ultimate or fundamental reality of self. Buddhist
reductionism/eliminativism (depending on the interpretation) is classically depicted in the Milindapañha,
when Buddhist monk Nagasena argues with Bactrian
King Milinda (thought to be Menander) that just as
the ‘chariot’ exists only as a conventional designation Given the Buddhist anātman doctrine it seems Budfor its pragmatically configured parts, but is neither dhism would equally deny the reality of autonomy. For
identical to nor additional to them, so too are all part/ Goodman (2009, 2016), a non-agent/non-self cannot
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be autonomous. If selves do not exist, there cannot be
autonomous selves, but that does not mean there cannot be autonomy—any more than the alleged nonexistence of red apples means there cannot be anything
red (Repetti 2012b). Those who deny partite wholes
like chariots—the classic Buddhist analogy—or selves
may be pressed to deny the parts of parts, and so on,
all the way down (Siderits 2003, 2008). But this is
problematic because whatever has magnitude is logically divisible ad infinitum. Thus, nothing partite is
reducible to anything non-partite, but non-partite indivisibles—if any—lack magnitude and thus cannot
aggregate to form anything that could play the role of
even an illusory whole. Since the world of experience
is populated by such aggregated or seemingly whole
entities, this line of reasoning alone cannot account
for it (Repetti 2012a). If this is an argument against
the reality of self, it is also an argument against the
reality of chemical bonds, hands, chairs, Buddhas, and
just about everything.
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to go into here, but analogous to the way empiricism
or phenomenology are understood differently within
different Western traditions. For an excellent introduction to the major doctrinal views on the distinction
based on authoritative Buddhist texts, see Thakchoe
(2011); for an in-depth analysis, see Thakchoe 2007.)
Arguably, the two-truths distinction maps loosely
onto the difference between mereological reductionism and mereological eliminativism: conventional
reality, on this view, involves a form of mereological
reductionism about wholes, in that wholes sort of exist, somewhat, pragmatically, but only because they
supervene on or reduce ultimately to things that really do exist at the micro-level, and ultimate reality,
on this view, involves a form of mereological eliminativism about wholes, in that they don’t really exist
at all (Siderits 2008). Joining these, we may say conventionally bridges exist, but ultimately nothing exists
independently of our conceptual designation of the
dependently-originated, momentary, insubstantial/
empty conditioned phenomena the aggregation of
Thus, attempts to rest negative conclusions about which we pragmatically identify as ‘bridges.’
autonomy on the rejection of wholes substitute one
mystery for another, and beg the question, because Thus, it makes conventional, pragmatic sense to divide
their premise is more problematic than their con- the world up into chariots and agents who drive them,
clusion. A similar analysis may be applied, mutatis although ultimately these decompose into series of
mutandis, to the other Buddhism-intrinsic grounds empty ephemera. Karma may be accounted for on
for the rejection of self, namely, dependent origina- this view as cause and effect, and reincarnation may
tion or impermanence. The fact that plants cannot be accounted for as an extension of the already-perexist independently of the photons that fuel their sisting illusion of personal survival that attends any
necessary photosynthesis does not entail that there two consecutive moments of ordinary consciousness
are no plants, but only that there are no ontologically in the same person-series—despite there being no ulautonomous plants—plants that exist independently timately existent self that is the bearer of karma, who
of plant-exogenous conditions. The putative fact that reincarnates, or who persists identically through any
all conditioned phenomena are at some ultimate lev- consecutive moments (Siderits 2003).
el impermanent does not imply that there is no such
thing, say, as the Verrazano Bridge, but only that its Despite its promising appearances, the two-truths
micro-constituents are in a constant state of change. doctrine (hereafter, “2Ts”) admits of divergent, comI could care less if the money in my account is con- plex interpretations (Thakchoe 2007, 2011), and
stantly vanishing, as long as it is constantly replacing. seems more problematic than autonomy does. Thus,
Similar reasoning applies to the suffering of sentient appeal to 2Ts is question begging, for if 2Ts is to
beings, the elimination of which is one of Buddhism’s ground a negative view of autonomy, as a premise 2Ts
prime directives.
requires greater support than the conclusion it purports to support (Repetti 2012a, 2012b). For 2Ts not
Buddhism avoids this line of objection by dividing only denies the ultimate reality of autonomy, but also
reality into two truths: conventional and ultimate. Sim- of hands, money, and just about everything else—explifying greatly, Buddhism acknowledges the conven- cept, on one reading (accepted only by pre-Mahāyāna
tional existence of plants, money, sentient beings, and Buddhists), the ultimate reality of dharmas (Sanskrit;
so on, but denies that such entities exist in ultimate re- Pāli: dhammas, micro-phenomena): impartite atomality. (This distinction is interpreted differently within istic psychophysical tropes like whiteness, sweetness,
major doctrinal divisions of Buddhism, too complex volition, and the like (Siderits 2003, 2008), which enMay 2015 | Volume 2 | Issue 2 | Page 85

				

tities are, from a Western philosophical and scientific
perspective, of a dubious nature (Repetti 2012a). At
the same time, 2Ts is analogous to the scientific bifurcation of such pairs of folk/scientific concepts as water/H20, weight/mass, and heat/mean molecular kinetic
energy. If all that is meant by “there is no such thing
as heat in ultimate reality” is that “there is only mean
molecular kinetic energy,” then the analogous claim
for autonomy as some complex form of volitional
self-regulation seems hardly eliminative. I see no bar
in Buddhism to the reductionist interpretation, which
I have developed elsewhere (Repetti 2012a, 2012b)
and sketch below.

Challenges to Autonomy from Causation
The four main skeptical arguments discussed above
may be grouped together with a variety of related
skeptical challenges to autonomy as challenges from
causation. These arguments are challenges from causation to the extent that they all involve some form of the
claim that because putatively free volitional behavior is
causally produced, conditioned, or influenced in some
way or another it cannot be free. The consequence argument may be the most straightforward challenge
from causation because it asserts that if putatively free
choices are caused by prior states of the universe in
accordance with deterministic laws, they cannot be
free, because alternatives are never available to agents
to choose otherwise than whatever choice the earlier
world-state determined. The manipulation argument
counts as a challenge from causation because it asserts
that there is no principled difference between manipulation of an agent’s beliefs, desires, or will by anything extrinsic to the agent, which renders the agent’s
choices unfree, on the one hand, and determinism, on
the other hand. The randomness argument counts as a
challenge from causation because it asserts that even
if the will is indeterministically caused it is not free,
because if choices are indeterministic, their random
occurrence is beyond the agent’s control. The impossibility argument counts as a challenge from causation because it asserts that the agent’s mental states
condition her choices, so they cannot be free, and
conditioning involves some kind of causal influence,
however unspecified. Illusionist arguments count as
challenges from causation because they rest on empirical findings that suggest causal deviance beneath
various cognitive abilities associated with autonomy
(e.g., unconscious biases, post-facto confabulation,
etc.), implying that our conscious states are causally
May 2015 | Volume 2 | Issue 2 | Page 86
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impotent in the production of our choices.

Optimist’s and Pessimist’s Dilemmas
Autonomy pessimists pose a certain dilemma for autonomy optimists, such that whether determinism
or indeterminism is true, there can be no autonomy.
Before laying out the dilemma, let us first articulate
some of its essential conceptual elements. Thus, the
basic idea in the consequence argument is that if A’s
cause B’s deterministically, they do so necessarily in accordance with exceptionless generalizations or laws;
so, if determinism is true, then all behavior occurs as a
necessary result of previously determined phenomena,
and the future only admits of exactly one temporal
event sequence that rules out all possible alternatives,
and thus rules out autonomy. The basic idea in the
randomness argument is that if A’s cause B’s indeterministically, they do so probabilistically, in accordance
with statistical generalizations that admit of exceptions; thus it is an accident which future emerges from
prior world-states, akin to the outcome of a coin toss.
Consider a dilemma faced by the optimist, from a
conjunction of the consequence argument’s and/or
the manipulation argument’s deterministic challenge
and the argument from randomness, the optimist’s dilemma:
1. Either determinism or indeterminism is true.
2. If determinism is true, agents cannot bring about
anything not already determined (regardless of
what criteria they satisfy), and thus lack autonomy.
3. If indeterminism is true, choices are random, thus
agents cannot claim to author them, and lack autonomy.
4. Thus, either way, autonomy is impossible.
This argument is the basis for hard incompatibilism,
all components of which have been discussed above.
However, as I have argued (Repetti 2010a), an opposite dilemma may be posed for the pessimist by retaining claim 1, negating and transposing the consequents across 2 and 3, yielding the opposite of claim
4, the pessimist’s dilemma:
1. Either determinism or indeterminism is true.
2. If determinism is true, choices are not random,
thus agents can claim to author them, and may
possess autonomy.
3. If indeterminism is true, agents can bring about
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things not already determined (and satisfy criteria solves; alternately, there is a possible world in which
that make a difference), and may possess autonomy. salt is thus exposed and dissolves. A hard determin4. Thus, either way, autonomy is possible.
ism that denies non-actual possibilities may be called
actualism, the view that only what is, was, or will be
This argument is the basis for soft compatibilism. In actual is possible. Actualism rules out non-actual possupport of its premises 2 and 3, I need only refer to sibilities, so if autonomy requires them (say, by requir2 and 3 in the optimist’s dilemma, transposing their ing that the agent could have done otherwise had she
conditionality, and to the works of other philosophers. wanted to), then autonomy does not exist.
Regarding premise 3, Kane (2002), Mele (1995), and
others have given good reasons to think indetermin- However, deterministic actualism cannot reject
ism may be situated in parts of the deliberative process counterfactual possibilities without defeating itself,
that would enhance autonomy; e.g., Kane constructs because determinism just is an abstraction from all
a model in which conflicting deterministic processes counterfactual-supporting generalizations or laws; for
generate an indeterministic space that opens up al- example, if A’s necessarily cause B’s, this supports the
ternate possibilities and enables the agent to be the counterfactual if there had been an A, then there would
efficient cause of which possibility is actualized, and have been a B, or the subjunctive if there were an A,
Mele has argued that randomness in the generation of then there would be a B. (Here I note, but set aside,
reasons for consideration, precursors to reasons for ac- worries about nearby possible worlds in which blocktion, would increase the creativity and diversity of such ers or masks render it false that B accompanies A, even
options, which intuitively would enhance the range of if A causes B, since such complications don’t bear on
possible choices opened to the agent. As for premise the present point.) Deterministic actualism is thus ox2, Frankfurt (1971), Dennett (1984), Flanagan (2002), ymoronic; by default, deterministic counterfactualism
Fischer (2006), and others have presented plausible is tautologous. Thus, the following approximation/
accounts of ways determined agents may act with sketch of a determinism-friendly subjunctive (or an
varying degrees of metavolitional/volitional accord, equivalent counterfactual) may be held to be partly
proximal self-regulation, voluntariness, and/or rea- constitutive of autonomy:
son-responsiveness sufficient for responsible agency.
If in doing x an agent would have done likewise
even if he could have done otherwise, and if he
Dispositions, Counterfactuals, Possibilities,
would have done otherwise had he wanted to, then
and Actualism
he is autonomous in doing x
Let us now challenge hard determinism. Just as salt is
soluble (in liquid), an agent is able to raise his hand Let us call this sketch the counterfactual principle of au(voluntarily). Consider a shortened version of the con- tonomy (“CPA”). CPA-type principles may be used to
identify a determinism-friendly model of responsible
sequence argument:
agency (Repetti 2010a).
1. Whatever is not determined can never arise.
2. Thus, an agent can never do otherwise—anything Unlike salt, which is helpless regarding whether it
meets its solubility condition (liquid immersion),
other than what was determined.
3. Because the agent can never do otherwise, the agents can bring about conditions needed to increase
what Buddhism identifies as mental freedom and thus
agent cannot be autonomous.
can cultivate abilities that increasingly satisfy CPA
Hard determinists may object that salt cannot bring conditions. Buddhism specifies how we may do so in
it about that it is placed in water. However, disposi- its many prescriptions for approaching nirvāṇa (Santions like solubility entail counterfactuals (hypotheti- skrit; Pāli: nibbāna, total mental freedom), by cultical statements contrary to the facts) of the form, “had vating, through meditative disciplines, true beliefs,
this salt been submerged in water, it would have dis- wholesome volitions, mindfulness, mental focus, mensolved,” or subjunctives of the form, “if this salt were tal stability, detachment, phenomenological insight
submerged in liquid, then it would dissolve.” Thus, it is into the triggers of our volitional processes, mental
possible salt dissolves, if certain conditions arise, even if equilibrium, etc., and by decreasing such things as
salt is never exposed to them, and never actually dis- false beliefs, unwholesome (ego-based) volitions,
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mindlessness, mental disturbances (anger, jealousy,
greed, hatred, craving), attachment, etc. Insofar as an
agent follows the prescription he will attain mental
freedom, which admits of degrees, and—this is the
main point of this paper—insofar as a being increasingly approximates nirvāṇa she increasingly satisfies
CPA in her choices, thereby exhibiting increasingly
effective autonomy.
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trol (Repetti 2010a; 2010b; Harvey 2007; Federman
2010). These skills are cultivated within a philosophical/soteriological system designed to reduce mental
bondage and increase mental freedom. Those three insights noted above arose upon the Buddha’s meditative
penetration into the phenomenology of experience:
impermanence (all is momentary), interdependence
(everything is dependent on everything that contributed to its existence), and insubstantiality/emptiness
Meditative practice is at the core of the development (everything lacks metaphysical essence/substance).
of these skills. Buddhism classifies meditation types— The nirvāṇa-generating insight that follows is that
simplifying greatly—as involving some concatenation there is no metaphysically substantive self. As one asof one-pointedness and mindfulness. These terms have similates the unreality of self, ego-volitions diminish.
technical meanings in Buddhism that are sometimes
conflated in English; in fact, many traditional Bud- Buddhist versions of CPA might express such ideas
dhists (Purser, Forbes, and Burke 2016; Purser and as that if agent A were thoroughly mindful of A’s voLoy 2013; Sharf 2012) object to the widely popular litions, A would be less driven by them or, if A had
Western extraction of the ethically-neutered ‘mind- made an effort to bring about an antidote volition
fulness’ as ‘bare attention’ successfully adapted to psy- V2 (say, compassion-involving) to counteract an unchotherapeutic uses in the mindfulness-based stress wholesome volition V1 (say, resentment-involving), A
reduction and mindfulness-based cognitive thera- would have displaced V1’s force. The less A is driven
py movements spearheaded by Kabat-Zinn (1991), by unwholesome volitions, the more control A has
which have mushroomed interest in ‘mindfulness’ over them. This increase in mental freedom is coexfrom the military to leadership, education. (For oppos- tensive with an increase in responsible self-regulation
ing views, see Brown et al. (2015), Federman (2016), (agency/autonomy).
Hyland (2014), Repetti (2016c).) Even philosophy is
on board (Davis 2016; Davis and Thompson 2015; Even if responsible agency is not afforded intrinsic
Garfield 2015; Repetti 2010b, 2016a, 2016b; Straw- value in Buddhism (because Buddhism seeks to move
son 1986; 2016; Thompson 2015).
away from reactive attitudes and the idea of an autonomous controller of actions), these considerations
Mindfulness is the translation for sati (Pāli; Sanskrit: show that the responsible agency adumbrated here
smṛti), which also suggests remembering and familiar- has instrumental (soteriological) value. Thus, though
ity, but as a technique refers to the ability to attend Buddhism avoids abstract philosophical discussions
non-conceptually to the experiential/phenomenolog- that lack soteriological warrants, this discussion is
ical features of the object of focus, thought to lead warranted.
to the deepest (Buddhist) metaphysical insights, i.e.,
impermanence, interdependence, and insubstantiali- Strawson’s Impossibility Argument
ty/emptiness. Insight is the translation for vipassanā
(Pāli; Sanskrit: vipaśyanā), although popular An- As noted earlier, influence counts as a challenge from
glophone usage loosely translates it as mindfulness. causation. Though Strawson is a kind of compatibiOne-pointedness is the translation for samadhi (Pāli, list (Repetti 2011), his impossibility argument rests
Sanskrit), the ability to maintain focus, thought to on influence, posing a more general challenge than the
lead to tranquility, ‘mental quiescence’ ‘calm abiding,’ optimist’s dilemma.
(Sanskrit: śamatha). Meditative discipline is also the
translation for samādhi, which includes both mind- The impossibility argument claims that the mental
fulness and one-pointedness as well as effort (Lutz, state one is in at the moment of choice influences or
Dunne, and Davidson 2007)
conditions that choice, rendering it a function of that
state and thus not ultimately free in the responsibiliThese practices also cultivate patience, detachment, ty-entailing sense.
greater distance or ‘elbow room’ between stimuli/
impulses and responses, and thus increased self-con- Strawson argues that the only way one could be unMay 2015 | Volume 2 | Issue 2 | Page 88

				

influenced and thus ultimately responsible for choice
is if one began in an uninfluenced state, but an uninfluenced state would only be possible for a being that
created itself ex nihilo (from no conditions), a kind of
causa sui or self-created being, which is logically impossible (to create oneself one must exist prior to one’s
creation).
Strawson’s argument may be taken, arguendo, to gloss
the other causal challenges. For, whether one’s mental state is deterministically, indeterministically, manipulatively, or unconsciously/neurally generated, it
remains that something influences one’s mental state
in the choice-moment. Thus, the impossibility argument subsumes most if not all skeptical, pessimistic
arguments discussed above, since how one’s choicemoment-mental-state is influenced is irrelevant to the
fact that it is influenced.
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mental-freedom-undermining influences, and thus
increases mental freedom, precisely through mental
state influences. These influences may be viewed usefully through the lens of Frankfurt’s distinction between first-order desires (for experiences or things)
and higher-order desires or metavolitions (that have
other volitions or desires as their objects, or pro- and
con-attitudes towards certain first-order desires).

The will of a person is typically volitionally/metavolitionally structured or hierarchical, for Frankfurt,
whereas the will of an infant or nonhuman animal is
typically unstructured, entirely first-order. Freedom of
will, for Frankfurt, is having the sort of will one wants,
such that the first-order desires one meta-volitionally approves are the only ones that succeed in action,
whereas weakness of will occurs when metavolitions fail
to regulate volitions. Chronic cases involve addiction,
compulsion, and other breakdowns of will. Despite
The Buddhist rebuttal to this version of the impossibil- its lack of adherents, and certain technical objections
ity argument constitutes an argument—not a proof— (Tuske 2013), these elements of Frankfurt’s model are
for possibilism, and a potential rebuttal to many of the insightful, explanatorily powerful, and highly intuitive
other skeptical, pessimist arguments and positions, (Repetti 2010a), particularly insofar as they fit nicely
excepting any that might have relevantly unique fea- with a certain Buddhist conception of freedom. Note
tures. (Clarke (2005) has a rebuttal to Strawson’s im- that I am not arguing that Buddhism endorses Frankpossibility argument, for example, that likely does not furt’s theory of autonomy, but only that it may adapt
apply to the manipulation argument.) Again, though Frankfurt’s distinctions to fruitful ends.
Buddhism has historically ignored the autonomy issue and some contemporary Buddhist scholars pre- Buddhist meditators are increasingly able to form
fer to, that Buddhism has the resources to formulate the sort of effective, hierarchically structured, mena possibility argument that can rebut many, most, if tal-freedom-oriented wills they want, through long,
not all of these challenges from causation is reason disciplined effort. Buddhist meditative training inalone not only to consider it, but to take it seriously. volves long-term discipline with one-pointedness and
mindfulness, an introspective analogue of intense athFrankfurt’s Distinction, Meditation, and Free- letic (proprioceptive) training of the body or of scientific (exteroceptive) training of analytic observadom-fostering Influences
tion that cultivates a heightened degree of impartial,
In my view, a Buddhist conception of autonomy may non-judgmental (but highly discriminative), non-rebe formulated negatively, as a kind of freedom from active, concentrated focus on and attention to the
various forms of mental bondage, particularly delu- phenomenology of the practitioner’s cognitive/conasional cognitive and volitional bondage. These are tive dynamics, which practice renders those dynamics
related in obvious ways when, say, we are mindlessly more transparent to the agent (Thompson 2015). This
attached to satisfying unwholesome desires based on long-term phenomenological investigation generates
cognitive errors. In Buddhism, all ego-based volitions detachment from spontaneously generated volitional
exemplify this relationship between ignorance about impulses—that is, an ability to not act on the sorts of
first-order volitions that typically lead to action.
the self and its corollary volitional bondage.
Practices that increase such bondage generate mental-freedom-undermining influences; practices that
decrease it generate mental-freedom-enhancing influences. Buddhism posits that meditation reduces
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Skill at introspective investigation of volitional phenomenology generates insight into the impersonal
nature and functioning of volitional phenomena, and
thereby fosters the meditator’s ability to dis-identify

with egocentric volitions, to not act on them, and to
increase control over them, as well as the meta-ability to form appropriate, effective pro- and con-attitudes or metavolitions regarding freedom- and
bondage-fostering volitional influences, respectively
(Harvey 2007; Federman 2010). That is, by cultivating heightened levels of introspective skill, long-term
meditation practitioners become increasingly mindful
of the functional dynamics of their volitional dispositions, increasingly able to refrain from acting on volitional impetuses, increasingly skilled at fostering those
cognitive/conative influences that are freedom-enhancing, and diminishing those that are bondage-enhancing (Wallace 2011). All of this is prima facie consistent with the 2Ts conception of the conventional
agent (the volition-regulating, hierarchically complex
meditation practitioner) as an ultimately impersonal
series of psychophysical phenomena, technical difficulties associated with the 2Ts and with Frankfurt’s
theory notwithstanding. Nonetheless, let’s review the
problem with Frankfurt’s theory, and show how easily
Buddhism can circumvent it.
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by any exact value of n for the formula of n+1 or n-1
grain, there are obviously more or less free minds and
choices, though they emerge from within conditioned
or influenced mental states and we have yet to demarcate their exact threshold conditions. But Buddhism
comes close in the Abhidharma and other texts (Bodhi 1995; Buddhaghosa and Nanamoli 2003), for example, which texts specify the stages on the path to
nirvāṇa, with extremely fine-grained phenomenologically-grounded analyses of various otherwise experientially coarse-grained mental states that involve differentiations between psychophysical tropes counted
in the trillions per blink of an eye (Vissudhimagga).
Skilled in introspective phenomenological investigation into the dynamics of volition, āryas (adept Buddhist meditation practitioners) are increasingly able
to refrain from acting on the sorts of mental-bondage-fostering volitional impulses that typically
prompt unskilled, ordinary individuals into action,
further diminishing their mental (cognitive/volitional) freedom, if not to fully detach from those impulses
and eliminate them in favor of antidote-type mental-freedom-fostering volitions. Surely, this skill places āryas toward the better end on the scale of mental-freedom-fostering and mental-bondage-fostering
influences. We need not be able to quantify the extent
of their mental freedom in precise terms, just as we
may not be able to specify the number of grains of
sand required for heaps, but surely there are small and
large heaps of sand as well as persons with lesser and
greater degrees of mental freedom.

Critics object that the theory implies it is a higher-level volition, say, L2, that renders the lower-level volition, L1, free (when L2 endorses L1), but to
render L2 free it must be endorsed by L3, and so
on, which self-iterative formula generates a regress
(Repetti 2010a; Tuske 2013). Even if this is fatal to
Frankfurt’s theory (which I doubt), it is not fatal to my
use of his distinctions within the CPA framework: the
Buddhist model needs no iterative formula, but only
the claim that metavolitional CPAs correlate increases in mental freedom with increases in responsible The impossibility argument seems to demand that
agency, avoiding any regress (Repetti 2010b).
any degree of mental-state influence entails mental
bondage or unfreedom, but this seems wildly implausible in itself, and much more so in light of the above
The Fallacy of the Heap
considerations. Even if we grant the point, however,
The Frankfurt-informed Buddhist model of responsi- which we need not, Strawson’s argument implicitble agency formulated above may be used to undermine ly differentiates between conditioning influences of
Strawson’s impossibility argument, although possibly two quantities, 0 and 0+n (where n is a non-zero or
not directly targeting what Strawson targets, as I’ll ex- positive quantity), and parses freedom and unfreeplain. The fallacy of the heap is a sorites type fallacy dom, respectively. Buddhism offers the possibility
because it erroneously infers that there are no such of transitioning from and thus escaping unfreedom
things as heaps of sand from the inability to demar- (0+n influence) and attaining total mental freedom
cate an exact number of grains of sand within a range (0 influence) upon the attainment of nirvāṇa, which
of n+1/n-1 grain that would be required to constitute may be defined for our purposes as liberation from
or identify a heap or non-heap of sand, respectively. all ego-volitional impulse and cognitive delusion—all
mental-freedom-undermining influences.
Just as there are obviously heaps of sand and nonheaps, though we may not be able to demarcate them Since Buddhism posits that unenlightened beings—
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beings caught within the realm of mental bondage—
may become enlightened, particularly through cultivation of the sort of meditation-based volitional/
metavolitional self-regulation discussed above, Buddhism implicitly rejects the impossibility argument:
mentally unfree beings are beings whose choices and
actions are influenced in mental-bondage-fostering
ways by certain mental states, but they can attain mental states that reverse and extend beyond the reach of
such influences and that completely extinguish them.
This is clearly not thought to require any ex nihilo causa
sui, so one way to diagnose Strawson’s error would be
to say he wrongly presupposes that the only way to
attain 0 influence is to be a causa sui. Alternatives include nirvāṇa, being created with libertarian free will
by God, being created somehow analogously by an expert simulated-world programmer (such that all your
programming leaves it open how your first choice
emerges), etc. Nirvāṇa is a possibility model for what
the impossibility argument says is impossible. It also
reveals that argument commits a sorites fallacy.
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Dharma-responsive Responsible Agency

The Buddhist teachings, path, or way may be referred to as the Dharma (Sanskrit; Pāli: Dhamma),
which term more generally denotes the soteriologically relevant dimension of the truth (according to
Buddhist understanding). If an agent is sufficiently
dharmic—sensitive and responsive to the truths of
impermanence, insubstantiality, and impersonality
as well as to the suffering of sentient beings—she is
what I have described as Dharma-responsive (Repetti
2010b). Dharma-responsiveness is a species of what
compatibilist and semi-compatibilist philosophers like
Wolf (1990) and Fischer (2006), respectively, have
described as reason-responsiveness, and have identified
as playing a central role in determining the extent to
which agents exhibit determinism-friendly responsible agency.

Semi-compatibilists separate moral responsibility from
autonomy: they are incompatible (hard) determinists
about autonomy because they think it requires indeI noted a qualification in the beginning of this section terminism, but compatible (soft) determinists about
moral responsibility because they think reason-reabout the targets of Strawson’s impossibility argument
sponsiveness suffices for it and is compatible with deand of the Buddhist response, suggesting possible
terminism. Reason-responsiveness may be compared
cross-purposes. Strawson specifically targets non-natwith wind-responsiveness: a weathervane that funcuralistic, ultimate-moral-responsibility-entailing contions according to its intended purpose is sensitive to
ceptions of agency, but does not target naturalistic,
the flow of wind as well as responsive to it, whereas
conventional conceptions of moral-responsibility-ena malfunctioning weathervane (e.g., a rusted one) is
tailing agency that may be described as proximal, relneither. Likewise, a rational being recognizes relevant
ative, or compatibilist. Since the Buddhist alternative
reasons in varying contexts and responds to them apon proposal here consists of some version of the latter propriately in choice and action.
conception, arguably Strawson’s impossibility argument does not threaten the Buddhist alternative, in Wolf, Fischer and other compatibilists and semi-comwhich case one might object that the Buddhist argu- patibilists reason differently to the shared conclusion
ment here misses the mark. True, insofar as Buddhism that even if agents lack the kind of autonomous ability
offers a naturalistic alternative, it is abstractly immune required to do otherwise under identical conditions
from arguments that target non-naturalistic concep- (impossible in a deterministic world, but possible in
tions (e.g., the causa sui). That—and how—Buddhism an indeterministic world or under a dualistic modcircumscribes such arguments is no doubt philosoph- el), insofar as they are moderately reason-responsive,
ically interesting.
they have enough of a compatibilist kind of autonomy that renders them morally responsible for their
However, Strawson’s impossibility argument has col- actions, precisely because they are able to recognize
lateral damage for Buddhism insofar as it implies that and respond appropriately to moral reasons—they are
nirvāṇa—freedom from all present/prior condition- functional moral agents, able to regulate volitions for
ing—is impossible. Thus, Buddhism is warranted in moral reasons (equivalent to metavolitions about voresponding to this collateral damage. Indeed, I take litions).
it that it is ‘collateral non-damage’ and a virtue of the
Buddhist defense of nirvāṇa that it undermines one Dharmic reasons are a species of reasons; Dharma-reof the most powerful anti-autonomy arguments.
sponsiveness is a species of reason-responsiveness.
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Thus, just as reason-responsiveness grounds compatibilist moral agency, so does Dharma-responsiveness.
This is a logical point, but substantive features of
Dharma-responsiveness establish the same conclusion
on extra-logical, Buddhism-intrinsic grounds. For a
Dharma-responsive agent is independently sensitive
to a network of moral reasons that concern whether
entities will suffer and that exclude biological and related attributes (kin, gender, species, etc.), rendering
them altruistic reasons.
Thus, Dharma-responsive agents are not only responsible agents, but at a level most consider supererogatory. Responsible agency here may be construed as causal/metaphysical responsibility, not merely utilitarian
in the sense critics intend by the idea that fostering
attitudes, norms, and institutions of holding people
responsible (possibly by Skinnerian means)—even
though, metaphysically, they are not responsible—
has social utility. For this sort of responsible agency
involves a complex array of CPAs the satisfaction of
which indicates that the agent instantiates volitional regulation and possesses what may be considered
Buddhist autonomy.
From the soteriologically framed perspective of
Buddhism, the more general abilities that constitute
reason-responsiveness only matter insofar as they
support Dharma-responsiveness, though the same soteriological instrumentality limits the importance of
this Buddhist form of autonomy. Nonetheless, despite
its intrinsic unimportance, this form of autonomy is
instrumentally essential to the entire Buddhist soteriological project, despite also the fact that upon attainment of the ultimate Buddhist goal of nirvāṇa, what
constitutes the agent—in an important sense, namely,
ego-volition-functionality—ceases to exist. But this
is the attainment of total freedom, paradoxically: a
kind of agentless agency (a concept explored in depth
in Repetti 2016; 2016b).
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the ultimately impersonal psychophysical stream that
is a person-series and that significantly shapes itself.
This ultimately impersonal person-series/set of (skillfully self-regulating) processes Buddhists refer to conventionally as an ārya, who through practice cultivates
effective metavolitions, is highly (causally) responsible
for shaping and sculpting the sort of self-process the
ārya becomes over time, and the more she does, the
greater her (morally) responsible agency, though the
more she advances the less substantive, static, or real
her self or her autonomy seems to her.
Theoretically, maximal mental freedom thoroughly eliminates the illusion of the separateness of the
self-process associated with responsible agency. But
in total mental freedom there’s no need for self-regulation, as there is no longer any separate, ego-volition-constituted psychological complex—conceived
by itself as—driving the person-series. Enlightened
action is spontaneously dharmic, in harmony with the
Dharma, the way ultimate reality is.

Socratic Buddhist Wisdom: Awareness of Ignorance and Illusion
Socratic wisdom consists in awareness of one’s ignorance, of the difference between what one does and
doesn’t know. Buddhism, philosophy, and science
share this aim of uncovering ways in which we are
subject to ignorance/illusion, in favor of a more ultimate reality (Blackmore 2014). Buddhism admits
we are mostly unfree because we are, more frequently
than not, in the grip of mental states that are deluded about the self and related misconceptions (permanence, substantiality, wholeness, and so on) and thus
filled with imbalances of volitional attraction or aversion such as greed and hatred, respectively. It seeks
to bring practitioners into greater awareness of these
delusions. In these regards, it aspires to enacting and
embodying Socratic wisdom.

Autonomous Non-agents? The Deflationary
From the ultimate or enlightened perspective,
Self
This model of responsible agency is consistent with
deflationary models of the self, as articulated by
Siderits (2003), Strawson (1986), Flanagan (2002),
Thompson (2015), and others: the self is not a thing,
but a densely clustered set of causal processes that are
significantly reflexively looped within the cognitive/
conative, metacognitive/metavolitional dimensions of
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everything conditioned, relative and conventional is
relatively illusory, but that does not eliminate important distinctions within the relative domain, such as
that between freedom and bondage, wholes and parts,
or those who have hands and amputees. Rather, the
sort of relative, proximal autonomy Buddhism cultivates is necessary to attain the non-illusory perspective of total mental freedom, enlightenment.
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The Consequence Argument, Neo-compatibi- Various versions of the argument identify various
forms of manipulation, internal, external, intentional,
lism, and the Manipulation Argument
This Buddhist conception of freedom also fares well
against other powerful forms of autonomy pessimism,
such as the consequence and manipulation arguments.
Let’s review the consequence argument to segue into
the more challenging manipulation argument, which
builds on the consequence argument idea that determined behavior cannot be free.
The consequence argument entails that determinism leaves open only a single event-series or single
outcome in each moment, thus an agent can never
bring about anything other than what is already a
determined consequence of past conditions together
with the laws of nature, so he cannot do other than
he does, lacks autonomy, and cannot be morally responsible (van Inwagen 1975). But neo-compatibilists like Frankfurt (1971), Dennett (1984), and Flanagan (2002) argue plausibly, along divergent lines, that
causation is consistent with some version of responsible agency—lines similar to those about metavolitional/volitional regulation, reason-responsiveness,
and so forth. This is likely why incompatibilists tend
to rely more heavily, as many, like Pereboom (2001),
now do, on the manipulation argument.
The manipulation argument asserts, most generally,
that whatever criteria the compatibilist produces as
sufficient for autonomy can be indirectly designed so
as to be satisfied by the agent proximately but ultimately by a hidden manipulator, and that determinism is
functionally analogous to, or morally indistinct from,
such manipulation. In the classic version, Pereboom
adduces a four-case version of the argument: in the
first case, say, case A, a neuroscientist remotely manipulates an agent’s neurons, rendering the agent unfree
(even if the agent apparently satisfies various compatibilist criteria); in B, the agent’s brain was modified
and programmed during infancy in such a way that it
would lead to the agent’s making the same choice as
in case A (and satisfy the same criteria); in C, circumstances in the agent’s environment are manipulated
so as to lead the agent to make that same choice; and,
in D, determinism is true. Pereboom challenges the
optimist to identify a morally relevant, principled difference between any two adjacent cases, claims there
cannot be any, and thus that determinism is no different from (responsible-agency-undermining) manipulation.
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and otherwise, and some versions order them in a sort
of sliding scale of intuitions, but because the agent is
only proximally but not ultimately responsible for the
fact that she satisfies the criteria in either case (in one
set of cases via manipulation, in the other via deterministic means), all versions place the burden on the
compatibilist to identify a relevant difference between
the ways in which such forms of manipulation are
autonomy-undermining and the way in which determinism is not (Vihvelin 2011). This is considered by
many to be the strongest argument against compatibilism. What can the Buddhist say in response?

Enlightened Brains in Vats
Suppose the ārya has satisfied sufficiently many Buddhism-specific CPA-type principles, whatever they
may be, rendering her significantly metavolitionally
self-regulating, Dharma-responsive, etc., thus exhibiting a robust Buddhist form of autonomy. Suppose
further that ārya was manipulated by agent-extrinsic means: conjure up whichever type of manipulative scenario suits your ‘phi-fi’ imagination (neural
implants, cult brainwashing, futuristic bionic/cyborg
brains designed in Skinnerian societies—whatever).
(I coined the neologism phi-fi for philosophical fiction,
akin to sci-fi (Repetti 2010a).) In the same way that
these sorts of conditions are obviously the manipulative causes of the agent’s merely proximal satisfaction
of the putative autonomy criteria and thus the agent
only appears to be autonomous, so too if determinism
is true, then determinism necessarily triggered a set
of functionally equivalent, ultimately agent-extrinsic
conditions that brought it about that the agent proximally satisfied those compatibilist autonomy conditions, in which case—by parity of reasoning—it only
appears that the Buddhist is autonomous in a deterministic world, but really is no more autonomous than
those directly manipulated agents in Pereboom’s fourcase argument.
This seems even more pressing in the face of the Buddhist denial of the ultimate reality of the self, for it is
bad enough for a non-Buddhist to face a challenge to
the effect that the putative agent is really just a puppet
whose strings are controlled by someone else, whereas
for the Buddhist there is not even a puppet to be controlled by others, but only strings controlled by impersonal forces and processes. The burden thus appears

to be squarely on the Buddhist to identify a relevant
difference between impersonally/deterministically
caused proximal satisfaction of autonomy criteria and
their manipulated proximal satisfaction.
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become a skilled meditator, one is able to cultivate
mindfulness of volitional states (and many other cognitive states) sufficient to enable one to detach from
their influences, whatever their origins. The ārya,
having reached an advanced stage in practice (by
whatever means), instantiates an established state of
mental quiescence, detachment, and clarity sufficient
to maintain equanimity and remain unperturbed and
unaffected by the arising and fading of all other mental states, regardless of whether those states occur randomly, deterministically, or as a result of manipulation.
In fact, certain Buddhists advocate the use of fear and
other manipulative devices as skillful means (a Buddhist doctrine approving otherwise immoral means
to soteriological ends) precisely on the grounds that,
all things considered, doing so will alleviate mental
bondage (Goodman 2009; Shantideva and Padmakara 2008). It would not matter for purposes of this argument if such a being were a cyborg fresh off a futuristic Buddhist assembly line, for if once such a being is
activated it instantiates the requisite causal/functional
cognitive/volitional abilities, apart from being as close
(functionally) to a causa sui as possible, that cyborg is
as free as its naturally-arising cousin.

The Buddhist model of freedom that I have been formulating, however, may easily respond to this argument, and more easily than the more generic compatibilist can. Suppose the neural correlates of a robust
form of autonomy or even of nirvāṇa could be generated by neuroscientific manipulation. Would that undermine them? Absolutely not! With manipulative enemies like that, one would not need friends. Whether
my satisfaction of the metavolition-regulating, mental-freedom-generating and related CPA-type Buddhist counterfactuals, or my partial or total mental
freedom was brought about by manipulation, determinism, chance, the Buddha’s blessings, God’s grace,
my meditative efforts, or anything else whatsoever
does not matter at all. And that is because whatever
has led me to be free has freed me! After over 40 years of
often tremendously difficult meditation practice of my
own, not to mention endless struggles with unwholesome volitions and the like in unrelentingly undermining daily routines, I would be among the first to
volunteer to be so manipulated. If only it was so easy! If Buddhism is right about the possibility of cultivating mental freedom, then the ārya can escape the
The generic compatibilist may need to differenti- intensely manipulative influences even of psychic venate between manipulation and determinism, insofar triloquists of the sort Descartes imagines with his deas such a theory is committed to backward-looking monic genius, or the physical equivalent as depicted
or historical considerations (i.e., to identify features in brain-manipulation and brain-in-a-vat scenarios.
of its causal history that explain how it came to act For it does not matter to such a being how an adharfreely). For the autonomous agent on that model is mic (unwholesome) mental state arises or by what or
construed to have a kind of independent identity and whose influence: what matters is whether or not the
integrity as a relatively/partly self-constituting being, mental state ought or ought not to be approved and/
a construction that is intuitively jeopardized by direct or acted upon. The advanced ārya does not differentior indirect (historical) manipulation. The Buddhist, ate between thoughts, volitions, or other mental states
however, has no such commitments, is not vulnerable that are mine versus not mine in general anyway, so
to such worries, and thus is under no burden to spec- the typical vulnerability of manipulation victims to
ify backward-looking principles that can differentiate thoughts, volitions, or other mental states that appear
between the two types of genetic cases. Likewise, lib- to be mine simply does not arise.
ertarians—who embrace indeterminism to avoid the
consequence and manipulation arguments—are more Indeed, in principle, if it is theoretically possible that
vulnerable to a genetic objection about the chance a brain placed in a vat of gelatinous fluid can still have
origination of their putatively free choices (the ar- a functional mind, then it is equally possible that an
gument from randomness), whereas Buddhists can ārya mind/brain in a vat can exhibit responsible agenaccept a kind of fortunate enlightenment, though cy and reach nirvāṇa. For such a minded brain in a
doctrinally they happen to reject chance because the vat, call it BIV, can still exhibit Dharma-responsiveBuddha rejected it (Federman 2010).
ness insofar as it remains receptive and responsive to
dharmic reasons, albeit in a virtual world. According
With or without such manipulation, once one has to the standard BIV thought experiment, such a mind
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cannot tell the difference between being a BIV wired
up to virtual senses, motor nerves, limbs, and perceptual fields constructed by algorithms and the like, and
being a brain in a skull, call it BIS, connected to actual
physical senses, motor nerves, limbs, and perceptual
environment. Nothing changes phenomenologically—ex hypothesi—between BIS and BIV. Indeed, according to Buddhism, being BIS is equivalent to being BIV because the world is functionally equivalent
to a virtual reality anyway insofar as it is significantly
conceptually constructed (Garfield 2011, 2015).
If BIV were fed experiences that presented BIV the
false impression that BIV had attained that state, this
might appear to undermine Buddhist confidence in
this line of argument. But technically it does not matter if anyone subjectively but falsely thinks they satisfy a
criterion. That is no counterexample for an externalist
account such as ours. What matters is the externalist
condition that the mind in question truly satisfies the
criterion, not the (true or false) internal impression to
the mind itself that it does. Thus, this variation on the
thought experiment may be set aside.
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given all the evidence of error associated with so
many conscious phenomena, and the fact that meditative states are altered states only seems to add to
their dubious status. But illusionism goes too far if it
concludes that all mental states are causally impotent
on the grounds that some of them are (Balaguer 2014).
Besides, neuroscience is not only open to the possibility that the Buddhists’ claims about the causal efficacy of meditative practices may be confirmed or
disconfirmed, if we find the neural correlates of these
mental states and abilities (Thompson 2015), but initial evidence along such lines is already promising
(Ie, Ngnoumen, and Langer, 2014). For example,
studies performed on Zen meditation practitioners,
ever training to be ceaselessly responsive to the experiential aspects of the present moment, reveal that
when they are presented with repetitive stimuli their
brains do not show any reduced responsiveness to the
repeated stimuli, whereas the brains of those in the
control group typically siphon off otherwise meaningless repetitive stimuli after a fairly short exposure
period (Kasulis 1985). Studies on ārya brains are actually helping neuroscientists identify neural correlates
of conscious mental states (Thompson 2015). Studies
performed on veteran practitioners of loving-kindness
meditations revealed far greater neuronal mass and
activation in the left pre-frontal cortex, the so-called
empathy center of the brain, than the control group,
during such meditations (Lutz, Dunne, and Davidson
2007). Studies reveal similar neuronal alterations in
the brain correlated with conscious meditative practices designed to discipline attention (Ricard 2011).
Studies not connected at all with meditation but rather simply with contrasting cases of mindfulness and
mindlessness confirm similar results (Ie, Ngnoumen,
and Langer, 2014). While these studies are too premature to ground any confidence in the claim that
the sort of model proposed here is true, they suffice to
support the claim that the model is not only empirically possible, but initially plausible.

What matters, then, is whether or not a mind genuinely instantiates the functional abilities in question,
not a momentary mental state impression to itself
that it does, nor the historical or genetic elements of
how it came about that it does. This is particularly
clear in the case of enlightenment, not to be confused
with pseudo-enlightened momentary states of altered
consciousness—something that often fools longterm meditation practitioners. The Buddha claims
that on the eve of his enlightenment he escaped the
(BIV-equivalent and evil-demon-equivalent) deceptions of Mara, the archetypal Buddhist cosmic deceiver, akin to Descartes’s evil demon. Only, unlike
Descartes, the Buddha did not conclude that the I
that thinks is real. Rather, he saw through it as just
another deception—indeed, the greatest, whereby he
attained freedom from the self, from its will, and from
all its manipulative influences. Once freed, nothing
can manipulate the enlightened being: nobody is left Conclusion
to count as the target of manipulation.
Although this model of (somewhat paradoxically
Challenge from Illusionism
agentless) autonomy is predicated on the limit case
of mental freedom, nirvāṇa, in light of the initial
On general illusionist grounds one may doubt that empirical confirmation of meditative practices, it is
any mental states whatsoever, meditative or otherwise, arguably plausible that to the extent anyone approxplay any truly causally efficacious role in the sub-per- imates that limit they instantiate some modicum of
sonal neural processes leading to choices and actions, free, responsible agency, whether their mental state at
May 2015 | Volume 2 | Issue 2 | Page 95

				

the choice-moment is deterministic, manipulated, or
conditioned.
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